Vietnam’s first domestically developed anti-submarine frigate is an ambitious attempt to leverage limited naval resources for asymmetric deterrence while accelerating the country’s transition to a more self-sufficient and diversified defense industrial base.
This month, numerous media outlets reported that Vietnam has begun construction of its largest and most advanced domestically designed surface warship, holding a steel-cutting ceremony for a multi-purpose anti-submarine frigate at the Song Thu Shipyard of the Ministry of Defense in Da Nang. The unnamed vessel, being built by Song Thu Corporation under the supervision of the Vietnam People’s Navy, is expected to be completed within 36 months to strengthen maritime sovereignty and counter underwater threats in the South China Sea.
Features of the frigate and strategic goals
The frigate, jointly developed with the state telecommunications company Viettel and domestic defense units, is equipped with indigenous active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar systems, surface-to-air missiles, and VCM-01 anti-ship missiles. The ship is designed to accommodate a Kamov Ka-28 anti-submarine helicopter and retains Russian-origin armaments, including a 76.2 millimeter main gun, RBU-6000 anti-submarine rocket launchers, vertical launching systems (VLS), and torpedo tubes.
During the frigate’s construction launch ceremony, Vietnam’s Deputy Minister of Defense, Lieutenant General Pham Hoai Nam, presented the project as part of broader efforts to strengthen maritime sovereignty, modernize the fleet, and achieve greater strategic autonomy in armaments and shipbuilding. At the same time, domestic production aims to reduce the country’s dependence on foreign military technologies. Vietnamese officials have not publicly named a specific adversary against which the frigate is intended. However, Vietnam has long-standing territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea and has been involved in naval clashes over disputed features.
Although the frigate itself does little to change the significant gap between Vietnam’s and China’s naval capabilities, it should be viewed in the context of Vietnam’s broader asymmetric naval strategy. As of March 2026, China has about 60 submarines, including six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), two nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGN), six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), and more than 50 conventional submarines (SSK). In contrast, Vietnam has six Kilo-class submarines (SSK). In response to this imbalance, Vietnam may employ a two-tiered asymmetric naval strategy: its Kilo-class SSKs can threaten China’s major surface combatants, while anti-submarine frigates can threaten Chinese submarines.
Challenges and diversification of defense partnerships
Vietnam may also use these forces as part of a «fleet in being» strategy, avoiding the need to destroy Chinese ships and submarines but making the disputed waters dangerous enough to limit China’s freedom of action. The presence of anti-submarine frigates in critical areas such as the Gulf of Tonkin could complicate China’s operational planning. However, turning this concept into a reliable combat capability may prove challenging.
As Evan Laksmana noted in a report for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in February 2026, Vietnam conducts only one open-sea exercise per year, and its four Gepard-class frigates and other ships go to sea only two to three times a month and rarely leave the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Laksmana notes that the maintenance costs of Vietnam’s Kilo-class SSKs may be three times their acquisition cost, leading them to remain mostly in port or used for ceremonial purposes. In addition to potentially excessive costs, Vietnam’s shipbuilding industry may face significant challenges, including a lack of metallurgical expertise and machinery production capabilities, dependence on imported materials, outdated shipyards, obsolete technologies, and insufficient capital.
Furthermore, Nori Lee noted in a June 2026 article in Modern Diplomacy that the Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (SBIC) has initiated bankruptcy proceedings, while the risks of secondary sanctions on Russian arms purchases complicate planning. Achieving this strategic autonomy may prove difficult given Vietnam’s continued dependence on Russian technical know-how. In a 2025 article in the peer-reviewed Russian Journal of Vietnamese Studies, Ngiem Tuan Hung noted that 70% of Vietnam’s heavy military equipment still comes from Russia, making a sudden transition to other manufacturers’ systems impractical. Hung emphasizes that maintenance, spare parts, training, and system integration keep Russia as a central element of Vietnam’s defense architecture.
This dependence also gives Vietnam strong incentives to diversify its defense suppliers. Le Thi Phuong Loan and Bach Thai Hien noted in an April 2026 article in the Journal of Science and Technology of the University of Da Nang (UD-JST) that Russia’s increasingly close ties with China raise questions about Russia’s reliability as a strategic partner. They also point out that the framework of the defense partnership between Russia and Vietnam prioritizes stability over military integration, deliberately avoiding joint defense commitments. Instead of abruptly replacing Russia, Vietnam is increasingly diversifying its defense partnerships to fill gaps in military capabilities, reduce dependence on a single supplier, and preserve strategic autonomy.
For example, in May 2026, Vietnam signed an agreement with India for BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, becoming the second customer for this type after the Philippines. The BrahMos missiles will complement existing Russian-origin missiles alongside indigenous systems such as the VCM-01. In addition to India, Israel has become a major supplier, providing small arms, spy satellites, SPYDER air defense systems, Heron drones, and EXTRA rocket artillery systems, the latter reportedly deployed at Vietnamese outposts in the South China Sea. South Korea has also supplied Vietnam with 155-millimeter K9 howitzers, marking a small but significant departure from Russian artillery calibers.
In 2016, the United States also lifted a decades-long arms embargo on Vietnam, allowing the transfer of Hamilton-class
